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2I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] exploits quantum mechanical effects to generate secret keys between two
users, Alice and Bob, against a quantum eavesdropper, Eve. Such a key may then be used to encrypt further
communications between Alice and Bob using the one-time pad which has been proven to be information-theoretically
secure by Shannon [3]. QKD has also been proven to be secure. Initial security proofs of QKD focused on the
situation that trusted or well-characterized devices are used [4–6]. Furthermore, many QKD experiments have also
been successfully demonstrated [7–16]. However, the applicability of these initial proofs in real-life situations is
questionable, since realistic devices can be untrusted or uncharacterized because they may be manufactured by Eve
or they simply operate imperfectly.
The security problem caused by using untrusted devices is a real problem, as demonstrated by various hacking strate-
gies on practical QKD systems, including the fake-state attack [17, 18], time-shift attack [19, 20], phase-remapping
attack [21, 22], detector-blinding attack [23, 24], and unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [25]. In these
attacks, device imperfections in QKD systems are exploited. From the study of hacking, we learn that the major
security issues lie in the detection system. Hence, how to remove detector side channels becomes a key question in the
area. To solve this problem, QKD protocols that are secure against detection loopholes have been proposed [26, 27],
none of which, however, is practical. Lo, Curty, and Qi presented a seminal work of measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDIQKD) [28], which can be practically implemented and is immune to all possible detector side channel
attacks. Recently, several experimental demonstrations of MDIQKD prove its practicality [29–32]. The MDIQKD
scheme shares the advantage with the BB84 protocol [1] that no entanglement is needed. Another approach that solves
all side channel problems at both source and receiver is by using an entanglement source in the device-independent
QKD (DIQKD) scheme [33–36].
MDIQKD and BB84 are attractive schemes for practical implementations because of their long achievable distances
and they operate in the prepare-and-measure manner. DIQKD suffers from the need of low loss channels and detectors,
limiting the distance, and the use of entanglement. But at this cost, DIQKD is superior in that it allows the source
and measurements to be completely uncharacterized. In contrast, a major common problem of standard MDIQKD
and BB84 is that they require the source states to be perfect, or well characterized [37, 38]. Otherwise, if the source
states can be arbitrary, it can be easily shown that they cannot generate any secret key. In this paper, we prove
that by incorporating the mismatched-basis data in the security analysis, MDIQKD and BB84 can generate secret
keys even when the source states are uncharacterized qubits. This is a modification to standard MDIQKD and BB84
which discard mismatched-basis data and ignore their statistics. In essence, our method endows MDIQKD and BB84
with a higher level of device independency, approaching that of DIQKD. We note that our method still requires
the source states to be qubits while this is not necessary in DIQKD. On the other hand, we remark that our qubit
assumption is not too stringent in many practical MDIQKD and BB84 systems. For example, in phase encoding
systems, it is reasonable to assume that the encoding states are in two-dimensional space while the accuracies of the
phase modulators may be questionable.
We remark that using the mismatched-basis statistics in security analysis has been proposed before. Barnett et
al. [39] showed that mismatched-basis statistics alone can detect the presence of intercept-and-resend attacks by Eve
when perfect source states are used. Watanabe et al. [40] used these statistics to improve the key generation rate of
BB84 for some types of channels but perfect source states are still assumed. Recently, Tamaki et al. [41] provided
a scheme that uses these statistics to mitigate the adverse effect of source errors but it requires full characterization
of the imperfect source qubit states. Here, our work is very different; we use the mismatched-basis statistics to lift
some restriction on the source. No detailed characterization of the qubit source is needed. Essentially, we show that
the case of no security at all (where the source qubit states are uncharacterized) can be made secure by using the
mismatched-basis statistics.
Let us look into the issue of mismatched basis in more detail. In the BB84 protocol, the encoding states of Alice
are the eigenstates of the Pauli operators Z or X , while Bob performs the Z- or X-basis measurements randomly to
measure the quantum state sent by Alice. In standard BB84, only the key bits and statistics of matched-basis cases
(i.e., Alice and Bob choose the same basis) are considered while the cross-basis data are discarded. This is reasonable
since Alice completely knows her encoding states and Bob is also sure that his measurement is either Z orX . Thus, the
statistics of mismatched basis are not needed in general. However, when we consider that Alice’s encoding operations
and Bob’s measurements are not fully characterized, the statistics for mismatched basis are needed. As an example,
we consider that Alice’s encoding states are all eigenstates of Z and Bob’s measurements are all Z projections. If
Alice and Bob are unaware of that, the protocol is of course not secure. But Alice and Bob can exclude this error
if they observe the statistics of the mismatched basis. Hence, the mismatched basis statistics should help the QKD
protocol to be secure even when there are some imperfections in their devices. We provide a proof for this in this
paper.
In the original MDIQKD protocol, Alice and Bob each encode their traveling qubits randomly from {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉},
3and send them to a measurement unit (MU) controlled by an untrusted party Eve, who is supposed to perform a
Bell-state measurement (BSM) on the incoming qubit pairs. Eve announces a message to Alice and Bob according to
her measurement result. A secure key can then be established between Alice and Bob given Eve’s announcements.
The advantage of MDIQKD is that its security does not rely on any assumption of the MU, which can even be
assumed to be fabricated or controlled by Eve; also, Eve is allowed to not cooperate and lie. Even under these
settings, the final key is still secure. However, the security of MDIQKD relies on the assumption that Alice and Bob
are able to characterize their encoding systems [37, 38]. Recently, by modifying the original MDIQKD and assuming
qubit sources, we have proved that even when the encoding systems are totally unknown, MDIQKD can still be secure
[42]. In this modified MDIQKD scheme which we call qubit-MDIQKD [42], the MU must be able to distinguish two
Bell states, while the original MDIQKD protocol identifies only one Bell state.
In this paper, we propose a modification to the original MDIQKD protocol. Unlike qubit-MDIQKD, our new
scheme only needs to identify one Bell state, while still allowing uncharacterized qubit encoding systems, thanks to
the incorporation of the mismatched-basis statistics. Here, we prove the security of this new scheme and show that it
outperforms the qubit-MDIQKD scheme. Our main proof here is for the new MDIQKD scheme and we can specialize
it to work on BB84 as well. The idea is to regard the MU and Bob in qubit-MDIQKD as Bob in BB84. Thus, with
one proof, we cover the security of both MDIQKD and BB84 using uncharacterized qubit sources. In BB84, our proof
also allows uncharacterized qubit von Neumann measurements to be used.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we present the details of the proposed MDIQKD scheme
and the main result of our security proof. The details of our security proof are given in the appendix. We adapt our
analysis to BB84 in Sec. III. In Sec. IV, we give a numerical simulation on the proposed scheme, which is also compared
to the original MDIQKD scheme and the qubit-MDIQKD scheme of Ref. [42]. We also show the performance of BB84
with mismatched-basis statistics (our new scheme) and compare it with the original BB84. Finally, we conclude in
Sec. V.
II. MDIQKD PROTOCOL WITH MISMATCHED-BASIS STATISTICS AND MAIN RESULT
The protocol setting for MDIQKD with uncharacterized qubit sources is as follows. Alice and Bob send their
encoded qubits to Eve for BSM, as shown in Fig. 1. When Alice (Bob) selects to output a state with index x (y), her
(his) encoding device emits a mixed qubit state ρA,x (ρB,y) to Eve. Alice and Bob do not know what these states are.
For simplicity, we assume that the states are pure states ρA,x = |ϕx〉〈ϕx| and ρB,y =
∣∣ϕ′y〉〈ϕ′y∣∣. This is without loss
of generality, and the mixed-state case automatically holds by using the same argument as in our qubit-MDIQKD
analysis [42]. We assume that the initial joint state with Eve’s system is ρA,x ⊗ ρB,y ⊗ ρE for all x, y where Eve’s
state ρE is independent of x and y. The MU performs a BSM on the incoming states and announces whether the
projection is successful to Alice and Bob. The MU is required only to identity one Bell state (same as the original
MDIQKD and unlike qubit-MDIQKD [42]).
FIG. 1. A schematic diagram for the MDIQKD protocol. BSM: Bell-state measurement, which is an untrusted device and may
be controlled by Eve; |ϕ0〉, |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, |ϕ3〉 (|ϕ′0〉, |ϕ′1〉, |ϕ′2〉, |ϕ′3〉) represent Alice (Bob)’s four encoding states.
We analyze its security using the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) method [5, 6], which is widely used for
security proofs of QKD. The essence of this method is to regard our protocol as one that generates entangled pairs at
the end. This means that we construct an equivalent EDP. Then based on this EDP, we obtain the relation between
the phase error rate and the bit error rate, the latter of which can be estimated in experiments. Finally, the key
generate rate can be calculated using this relation. We give the equivalent EDP version of our protocol as follows.
1. Alice and Bob prepare N pairs of entangled states,
|φ+〉AC = (|0〉A|ϕ0〉C + |1〉A|ϕ1〉C + |2〉A|ϕ2〉C + |3〉A|ϕ3〉C)/2,
|φ+〉BD = (|0〉B|ϕ′0〉D + |1〉B|ϕ′1〉D + |2〉B|ϕ′2〉D + |3〉B|ϕ′3〉D)/2,
(1)
4respectively. The subscripts A and B denote Alice’s and Bob’s classical raw key bits, respectively, where we
assign values 0 and 1 to basis 0 and values 2 and 3 to basis 1. The states |ϕx〉C and |ϕ′x〉D (x = 0, 1, 2, 3)
are, respectively, Alice’s and Bob’s uncharacterized encoding qubits to be sent to the MU. Alice and Bob are
only know that |ϕx〉C and |ϕ′x〉D are 2-dimensional states but do not know the details, since they do not
trust the accuracies of their encoding systems. Essentially, Alice’s and Bob’s emitted states are determined
by a measurement. By measuring her half of the system, Alice collapses the system C to one of |ϕi〉C with
i = 0, 1, 2, 3 with equal probabilities, which is equivalent to Alice preparing the system C in one of the four
states with equal probabilities; similarly for Bob.
2. Alice and Bob send the states, labeled by C and D respectively, to Eve who announces her BSM result. There
are two possible outcomes: BSM failure, or a successful measurement result in the Bell states
|φ+〉CD = (|0〉C |0〉D + |1〉C |1〉D)/
√
2. (2)
For the first outcome Eve announces message z = 0 to Alice and Bob, while message z = 1 is announced for the
second outcome. One must note that Eve might not honestly announce her measurement results, or might not
even perform the above mentioned BSM. However, Eve must announce a message z = 0 or z = 1 to Alice and
Bob for each trial.
3. After receiving Eve’s message, Alice and Bob perform bit sift: they discard their bits when Eve announces a
BSM failure (z = 0). Then, they project systems A and B in Eq. (1) onto |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| or |2〉〈2|+ |3〉〈3|, which
correspond to basis 0 and basis 1, respectively. They perform basis sift next: when their systems collapse onto
the same bases, by sacrificing some bits for error testing1, they can deduce conditional probability distributions
p(z|x, y) where z = 0, 1 stands for Eve’s announcements (failure or Eq. (2) respectively), and x and y (x, y ∈
{0, 1, 2, 3}) represent the states of systems A and B. When their systems collapse onto different bases, they
deduce similar probability distributions p(z|x, y), but the raw key bits are discarded.
4. Finally, Alice and Bob perform EDP on systems A and B and obtain maximally entangled Bell states |φ+θ〉AB =
(|0〉A|0〉B + eiθ|1〉A|1〉B)/
√
2, where secret key bits can be extracted.
The conditional probabilities of the measurement result by a lossless MU are listed in Table I, from which one can
see that there is a 75% intrinsic loss for the original MDIQKD scheme when only one Bell state can be distinguished.
TABLE I. List of conditional probabilities p(z|x, y) for the case where Alice and Bob choose one of the four BB84 states with
equal probabilities. Only cases where they choose the same basis are considered. No loss is considered.
❍
❍
❍
❍z
x, y
0,0 0,1 1,0 1,1 2,2 2,3 3,2 3,3
0 1/2 1 1 1/2 1/2 1 1 1/2
1 1/2 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 0 1/2
❍
❍
❍
❍z
x, y
0,2 0,3 1,2 1,3 2,0 3,0 2,1 3,1
0 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
1 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
Before introducing our security proof, let us see why statistics of mismatched basis cases can be used to generate
secure key bits with a simple example. In the original MDIQKD protocol, Alice and Bob extract a secure key from
the first half (matched-basis case) of the results shown in Table I, and discard the second half (mismatched-basis
case). Such postprocessing would fail when Alice and Bob do not trust the accuracy of their qubit encoding systems.
Consider the case when |ϕ0〉 = |ϕ2〉 = |0〉 and |ϕ1〉 = |ϕ3〉 = |1〉 for both Alice and Bob. It is obvious that Alice and
Bob may still observe probabilities p(z|x, y) with perfect correlations for the matched-basis case, but all key bits can
be eavesdropped by Eve. On the other hand, the results from the mismatched-basis, the second half of Table I, can
be used to exclude this attack, in which Alice and Bob would find perfect correlations instead of random results.
Main Result: In above protocol, if Alice and Bob observe the probabilities p(z|x, y), their final secret key bits in
basis 0 is given by R = 1 − H(eb) − H(ep), in which H(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the Shannon’s binary
1 An alternative way to do that is by performing error verification after error correction [43, 44].
5entropy function. The bit error rate in basis 0 is given by
eb =
p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0)
p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0) , (3)
and phase error rate is bounded by
ep 6 ε+ eb. (4)
The deviation ε is defined as
ε , max
C,C′
f(C,C′), (5)
where the maximization takes over all non-negative real numbers C30, C31, C
′
20 and C
′
21 satisfying definite constraints
to find the maximum value of function f(C,C′),
f(C,C′) =

min{
(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|1,1)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
30
C′2
20
,(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|0,0)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
31
C′2
21
}, if C30C′20 6= 0 and C31C′21 6= 0(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|1,1)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
30
C′2
20
, if C30C
′
20 6= 0 and C31C′21 = 0(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|0,0)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
31
C′2
21
, if C30C
′
20 = 0 and C31C
′
21 6= 0
1− eb, if C30C′20 = 0 and C31C′21 = 0,
(6)
where min{a, b} yields the smaller one of real numbers a and b. And constraints for searching the maximum value are
− 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|1, 0)C30C31 6 p(1|3, 0)− p(1|0, 0)C230 − p(1|1, 0)C231 6 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|1, 0)C30C31
− 2
√
p(1|0, 1)p(1|1, 1)C30C31 6 p(1|3, 1)− p(1|0, 1)C230 − p(1|1, 1)C231 6 2
√
p(1|0, 1)p(1|1, 1)C30C31
− 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|0, 1)C′20C′21 6 p(1|0, 2)− p(1|0, 0)C′220 − p(1|0, 1)C′221 6 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|0, 1)C′20C′21
− 2
√
p(1|1, 0)p(1|1, 1)C′20C′21 6 p(1|1, 2)− p(1|1, 0)C′220 − p(1|1, 1)C′221 6 2
√
p(1|1, 0)p(1|1, 1)C′20C′21.
(7)
We can see that the cross-basis statistics restrict the variables C30, C31, C
′
20 and C
′
21. Thus, the phase error rate
is obtained by numerical optimization. The proof of this main result is detailed in appendix. Note that with the
procedure introduced in the Sec. IV of Ref. [42], our main result applies to case that Alice’s and Bob’s encoding states
are two-dimensional mixed states, although the proof given in appendix is based on two-dimensional pure states.
Above results are general results for arbitrary observed probabilities p(z|x, y), but it seems a bit complicated.
For ease of understanding, we simplify our results for typical MDIQKD implementations. Consider in a successful
experiment for MDIQKD, one may observe that p(1|00) = p(1|11), p(1|01) = p(1|10) and p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) =
p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2) = (p(1|00)+ p(1|01))/2. Under this case, we simplify the function f(C,C′) and the constraints as
f(C,C′) =

(√
e′
b
+
√
eb(C30C
′
21
+C31C
′
20
)+
√
1−eb
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
4max{C2
30
C′2
20
,C2
31
C′2
21
} , if C30C
′
20 6= 0 and C31C′21 6= 0(√
e′
b
+
√
eb(C30C
′
21
+C31C
′
20
)+
√
1−eb
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
4C2
30
C′2
20
, if C30C
′
20 6= 0 and C31C′21 = 0(√
e′
b
+
√
eb(C30C
′
21
+C31C
′
20
)+
√
1−eb
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
4C2
31
C′2
21
, if C30C
′
20 = 0 and C31C
′
21 6= 0
1− eb, if C30C′20 = 0 and C31C′21 = 0,
(8)
where e′b = p(1|3, 2)/(p(1|0, 0)+p(1|0, 1)), andmax{a, b} yields the larger one of real numbers a and b. And constraints
6for searching maximum value are simplified as
− 2
√
eb(1− eb)C30C31 6 1
2
− (1 − eb)C230 − ebC231 6 2
√
eb(1− eb)C30C31
− 2
√
eb(1− eb)C30C31 6 1
2
− ebC230 − (1− eb)C231 6 2
√
eb(1− eb)C30C31
− 2
√
eb(1− eb)C′20C′21 6
1
2
− (1 − eb)C′220 − ebC′221 6 2
√
eb(1− eb)C′20C′21
− 2
√
eb(1− eb)C′20C′21 6
1
2
− ebC′220 − (1− eb)C′221 6 2
√
eb(1− eb)C′20C′21.
(9)
III. BB84 WITH UNCHARACTERIZED SOURCES AND MEASUREMENTS
Our MDIQKD security analysis can be directly applied to the BB84 protocol with the following conditions:
• Alice prepares one of four uncharacterized qubit states;
• Bob receives a qubit state from the channel;
• and Bob’s measurement is one of two uncharacterized qubit von Neumann (projective) measurements corre-
sponding to the two BB84 bases.
This means that the measurement for each basis is a projection onto two orthogonal states. Let Bob’s qubit measure-
ment for basis 0 be a projection onto {|ϕ¯′0〉, |ϕ¯′1〉} and for basis 1 be {|ϕ¯′2〉, |ϕ¯′3〉} where 〈ϕ¯′0|ϕ¯′1〉 = 〈ϕ¯′2|ϕ¯′3〉 = 0 and
|ϕ¯′0〉〈ϕ¯′0|+ |ϕ¯′1〉〈ϕ¯′1| = |ϕ¯′2〉〈ϕ¯′2|+ |ϕ¯′3〉〈ϕ¯′3| = I.
The main idea is to merge the MU and Bob in the MDIQKD setting to become Bob in the BB84 setting (see
Fig. 2). In the BB84 picture, Alice emits a qubit state which is processed by Eve and is received by Bob as ρx. Bob
chooses basis 0 or 1 with equal probabilities to measure it. The probability of obtaining My = |ϕ¯′y〉〈ϕ¯′y |, y = 0, 1, 2, 3
conditional on a chosen basis is tr(ρxMy).
Alternatively, Bob may do the following to perform effectively the same measurement. Bob prepares one of the
four states |ϕ′y〉, y = 0, 1, 2, 3, with equal probabilities and makes a BSM on ρx ⊗
∣∣ϕ′y〉〈ϕ′y∣∣. If the BSM produces the
projection outcome of |φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, then this is equivalent to measuring ρx with My. The key to this
argument is to notice that
(〈ϕx|A
〈
ϕ′y
∣∣
B
)(|00〉+ |11〉)AB =
〈
ϕx|ϕ¯′y
〉
A
for any |ϕx〉 and
∣∣ϕ′y〉 where ∣∣ϕ¯′y〉 is the complex conjugate of ∣∣ϕ′y〉. This means that the probability of obtaining a
|φ+〉 projection by the BSM is
p(1|x, y) = tr (|φ+〉〈φ+|(ρx ⊗ ∣∣ϕ′y〉〈ϕ′y∣∣))
=
1
2
tr(ρxMy).
The term p(1|x, y) corresponds to a hypothetical MDIQKD setting where the MU identifies |φ+〉 and the last term
corresponds to the BB84 setting. Thus, we can regard the BB84 setting where we drop half of the measurement
outcomes as an MDIQKD setting where the measurement outcomes are kept when the MU gets |φ+〉. To make this
equivalence rigorous, we also need the freedom to choose the distribution for selecting y in the MDIQKD setting to
match the occurrences of y in the BB84 setting. We have this freedom in the MDIQKD setting because the phase
error bound in our security proof is independent of this distribution. Since the MDIQKD situation is a restricted case
of the general one considered in our proof (because we consider a specific MU that identifies |φ+〉 honestly and Eve is
allowed to intervene with Alice’s state only), it is covered by our proof, which means that the equivalent BB84 setting
where half of the outcomes are dropped is also covered by our proof. To get a relationship between bit and phase
error rates for the actual BB84 protocol, we simply obtain the measurement probabilities tr(ρxMy) in the experiment
and use them as p(1|x, y) in the formulas (4)-(7), since the factor of half will be canceled out anyway. Note that in the
actual BB84 protocol, there is no need to drop half of the outcomes because both the dropped half and the retained
half have the same statistics anyway. We could have kept the dropped half and would have obtained the exact same
phase error bound. Thus, the two halves can be used together to generate a secret key.
7FIG. 2. The security proof of MDIQKD (left) can be applied to BB84 (right) when the MU is merged into Bob. We impose
that the MU honestly announces the |φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 outcome when it performs the BSM. The two von Neumann
(projective) measurements of Bob on the right correspond to the two BB84 bases and each projects onto two orthogonal qubit
states. The relationship between the states in MDIQKD and BB84 is that
∣
∣ϕ′y
〉
is the complex conjugate of
∣
∣ϕ¯′y
〉
for y = 0, 1, 2, 3.
IV. SIMULATION
We first consider the case that Alice and Bob use ideal BB84 senders (not trusted by Alice and Bob though) and
an ideal Bell-state MU to perform our new protocol with noiseless channel and no Eve’s attack, but with photon
absorption taken into consideration. One must observe that eb = 0, p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) = p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2) =
p(1|0, 0)/2 = p(1|1, 1)/2, then with constraints (7), we deduce that C30 = C31 = C′20 = C′21 = 1/
√
2. Then, through
(6), it is easy to verify that ε = 0 and thus ep = 0. Hence, MDIQKD can be secure in this situation.
In general, an analytical expression for the key rate is hard to obtain when channel errors are presented. One can
measure values of p(z|x, y) from experiments directly and obtain the key rate (such value needed in postprocessing)
via numerical methods. For comparison, we assume the errors appeared in the state preparation and measurement
are absorbed into the channel, which can be controlled by Eve. In the simulation, four single photon detectors (SPDs)
with the dark counting rate of d are used in the MU. Denote η as the total transmission efficiency of the channel from
Alice (Bob) to the MU in the middle of channel and thus η is also the probability that a single photon from Alice or
Bob can trigger a SPD of the MU.
Consequently, if Alice and Bob both emit qubit |0〉 or |1〉, the MU will announce message 1 with probability
p(1|0, 0) = p(1|1, 1) = η2(1− d)2/2 + 2η(1− η)d(1− d)2 + 2(1− η)2d2(1− d)2, in which the first item corresponds to
the case that the projection of the incoming photons into |φ+〉CD is successful: the two photons trigger the two SPDs
and the remaining two SPDs do not give dark clicks. The second item accounts for the case that only one photon
triggers one SPD but a dark count occurs in one relevant SPD, and the last item represents the case that two photons
are absorbed by the channel but two dark counts occur in two relevant SPDs. And p(0|0, 0) = p(0|1, 1) = 1− p(1|0, 0)
also holds.
By the similar considerations, we set p(1|1, 0) = p(1|0, 1) = p(1|3, 2) = 2(1 − η)2d2(1 − d)2 + 2η(1 − η)d(1 − d)2,
and p(0|1, 0) = p(0|0, 1) = 1 − p(1|1, 0), p(1|3, 0) = p(1|3, 1) and p(1|0, 2) = p(1|1, 2). Note that the formulas for the
simulation are relevant to the existing literature (cf., Eq.(7) in [45]). The secure-key rate (unit: per pulse under basis
0) versus total transmission loss of channel from Alice or Bob to the MU is given by Fig. 3 and Fig. 4.
In Fig. 3, the secure-key rate for original MDIQKD is given by the solid line, in which we assume that Alice and
Bob know that their encoding states are perfect, the MU can only distinguish Bell state |φ+〉CD, and Eve is passive.
The secure-key rate for our protocol is given by the dashed line, in which we have ideal BB84 senders (but we do not
trust them now), MU can distinguish one Bell states |φ+〉CD, and Eve is passive. In Fig. 4, we consider that practical
coherent sources are used by Alice and Bob, and infinite decoy states[46–48] are employed.
Additionally, a numerical simulation for BB84 with uncharacterized qubit sources and measurements is given in
Fig. 5. In this simulation, we use the same parameters as the simulation for MDIQKD.
In practice, only a finite number of decoy states are used. We simulate our proposed BB84 case with three decoy
states (i.e., vacuum state + weak decoy state + signal state) and with statistical fluctuations in Fig. 6. We assume
that the mean photon number of the Poisson-distributed weak decoy state and signal state are 0.1 and 0.5 respectively.
The pulse number of each encoding states is set to N and 5-times standard derivation is considered.
The above simulations consider the cases with no encoding misalignments. However, encoding misalignments are
inevitable in QKD systems and the power of our method is that we do not need to characterize misalignment errors.
For simplicity, we give a numerical simulation for BB84 protocol with the following typical encoding misalignments.
We assume that Alice’s encoding system prepares quantum states |ϕ0〉 = |0〉, |ϕ1〉 = sin a|0〉 + cos a|1〉, |ϕ2〉 =
cos(pi/4+b)|0〉+sin(pi/4+b)|1〉, and |ϕ3〉 = sin(pi/4+c)|0〉−cos(pi/4+c)|1〉 for inputting x = 0, 1, 2, 3. Here, the degrees
of angles a, b and c are the encoding misalignments. Without loss of generality, we assume that Bob’s measurements are
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Secure-key rate R (unit: per pulse of basis 0) vs total transmission loss (dB) of channel from Alice or
Bob to MU when single photon sources are equipped: we set d = 10−5 per pulse. The solid line represents MDIQKD with
perfect trustworthy BB84 senders’ devices, MU without optics misalignment, which can distinguish one Bell state |φ+〉CD, and
no Eve’s attack; the dashed line is for the protocol proposed here, in which perfect BB84 senders’ devices (but not trusted
by Alice and Bob), MU without optics misalignment, which can distinguish one Bell states |φ+〉CD, and no Eve’s attack; the
dotted line is for the qubit-MDIQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [42], in which perfect BB84 senders’ devices (but not trusted
by Alice and Bob), MU without optics misalignment, which can distinguish two Bell states |φ+〉CD and |ψ+〉CD, and no Eve’s
attack.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Secure-key rate R (unit: per pulse of basis 0) vs total transmission loss (dB) of channel from Alice or
Bob to MU when practical coherent sources are equipped: we set d = 10−5 per pulse. The solid line represents MDIQKD
with trustworthy coherent source with mean photon number µ = 0.5, MU without optics misalignment, which can distinguish
one Bell state |φ+〉CD, and no Eve’s attack; the dashed line is for the protocol proposed here, in which coherent source with
mean photon number µ = 0.5 (its encoding is not trusted by Alice and Bob but its photon statistics is trustworthy), MU
without optics misalignment, which can distinguish one Bell states |φ+〉CD, and no Eve’s attack; the dotted line is for the
qubit-MDIQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [42], in which coherent source with mean photon number µ = 0.5 (its encoding is
not trusted by Alice and Bob but its photon statistics is trustworthy), MU without optics misalignment, which can distinguish
two Bell states |φ+〉CD and |ψ+〉CD, and no Eve’s attack. Infinite decoy states are employed here.
ideal BB84 measurements without misalignment. Consequently, we have that p(1|0, 0) = η(1−pd)+(1−η)pd(1−pd),
p(1|1, 1) = (1−pd)η cos2 a+(1−η)pd(1−pd), p(1|0, 1) = (1−η)pd(1−pd), p(1|1, 0) = (1−pd)η sin2 a+(1−η)pd(1−pd),
p(1|3, 2) = (1−pd)η(sin(pi/4+c)−cos(pi/4+c))2/2+(1−η)pd(1−pd), p(1|3, 0) = (1−pd)η sin2(pi/4+c)+(1−η)pd(1−pd),
p(1|3, 1) = (1 − pd)η cos2(pi/4 + c) + (1 − η)pd(1 − pd), p(1|0, 2) = (1 − pd)η/2 + (1 − η)pd(1 − pd), and p(1|1, 2) =
(1 − pd)η(sin a + cos a)2/2 + (1 − η)pd(1 − pd). The key rates with different misalignments and channel loss are
illustrated in Fig. 7, from which we can see that with the help of mismatched-basis statistics the secure key rate only
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Secure-key rate R (unit: per pulse of basis 0) vs total transmission loss (dB) of channel from Alice
to Bob: we set d = 10−5 per pulse. The solid line represents original BB84 protocol with perfect trustworthy BB84 senders’
devices and measurement device; the dashed line is for the protocol proposed here, in which perfect BB84 senders’ devices
(but not trusted by Alice and Bob) are equipped while Bob’s measurement devices are also uncharacterized 2-dimensional
projections.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Secure-key rate R (unit: per pulse of basis 0) vs total transmission loss (dB) of channel from Alice
to Bob: we set d = 10−5 per pulse. The solid line represents the proposed BB84 protocol with infinite decoy states; Other
lines are all for the three-decoy-state protocol (i.e., vacuum states + weak decoy states +signal states) and the mean photon
number for decoy states and signal states are 0.1 and 0.5 respectively. the dashed line, dotted line, dashed-dotted line and
dashed-dotted-dotted line are for N =∞, 1010, 108, 106 respectively.
degrades with misalignment errors a, b, c slightly. And, within a reasonable misalignment range, our protocol is still
very practical.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose that the statistics for the bits from mismatched bases can relax the assumptions on
the encoding devices in original MDIQKD and BB84 protocols. Our method does not need any modification of the
original MDIQKD or BB84 protocol, except that Alice and Bob should obtain some statistics of bits from mismatched
bases. Alice and Bob do not need to guarantee the accuracies of their encoding systems except that they need to
be sure that the encoding states are two-dimensional. Note that our assumptions satisfy many practical MDIQKD
and BB84 systems. For example, in phase encoding systems, it is reasonable to assume that encoding states are in
two-dimensional space while the accuracies of the phase modulators may be questionable. The simulation results show
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Secure-key rate R (unit: per pulse of basis 0) vs total transmission loss (dB) of channel from Alice to
Bob: we set d = 10−5 per pulse. The solid line represents the proposed BB84 protocol without encoding misalignment; the
dashed line is for the case that a = b = c = 3◦, the dotted line is for the case that a = b = c = 6◦, and the dashed-dotted line
is for the case that a = b = c = 9◦.
that with decoy states, our scheme can distribute secure key bits over long distances (over 100km). Our main proof
is for the MDIQKD protocol, but we show that it can be used for the BB84 protocol with uncharacterized sources
and measurements by considering the MU to be part of Bob.
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Appendix A: Proof of main result
We prove our main result here. Following a similar argument used in Ref. [6], an EDP has been given in section II.
Given that the initial states of Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s ancillas are separable, the most general collective attack by
Eve can be represented by a unitary transformation as follows:
UEve|ϕx〉C |ϕ′y〉D|e〉Ea|0〉M =
√
p(0|x, y)|Γxy0〉E |0〉M +
√
p(1|x, y)|Γxy1〉E |1〉M , (A1)
where x, y = {0, 1, 2, 3}, |e〉Ea is Eve’s arbitrary ancilla, |0〉M is the message which will be sent to Alice and Bob, and
|Γxy0〉E and |Γxy1〉E are all normalized Eve’s arbitrary quantum states for Eve’s ancilla and photons C, D. Here, we
remark that our collective attack modeled by Eq. (A1) includes both basis-independent attack and basis-dependent
attack [49]. In a basis-independent (-depedent) attack, the density matrix of the states emitted by Alice and Bob for
basis 0 is the same as (different from) that for basis 1. The basis dependence can be measured by fidelity. In general,
for basis-dependent attacks, Eve may obtain basis information by some measurements and adopt different operations
accordingly. Any measurement that Eve may utilize to learn the basis and the followup operations can be seen as
part of an extended unitary transformation on Alice’s and Bob’s encoding states and her ancilla given by Eq. (A1).
We again assume that Alice and Bob do not know the details of |ϕx〉C and |ϕ′y〉D (x, y = 0, 1, 2, 3).
Recall that |ϕx〉C and |ϕ′y〉D are both in the two-dimensional Hilbert space and they are disjoint (|ϕxy〉CD =
|ϕx〉C |ϕ′y〉D) , we may arbitrarily assign a phase to each of them. Thus
11
|ϕ2〉C = C20|ϕ0〉C + C21eiθ2 |ϕ1〉C
|ϕ3〉C = C30|ϕ0〉C + C31eiθ3 |ϕ1〉C
|ϕ′2〉D = C′20|ϕ′0〉D + C′21eiθ
′
2 |ϕ′1〉D
|ϕ′3〉D = C′30|ϕ′0〉D + C′31eiθ
′
3 |ϕ′1〉D
(A2)
must hold for some non-negative real numbers Cxy and C
′
xy.
To begin our analysis, without loss of generality, we can assume in Eq. (A1) that |Γxyz〉E =
∑
n γxyzn|n〉E , in which
|n〉E are a set of normalized orthogonal bases of Eve’s states, and complex number γxyzn =E 〈n|Γxyz〉E , satisfying∑
n
∣∣γxyzn∣∣2 = 1. Thus, the density matrix for the case that Alice and Bob both select basis 0 is
ρ =
1
p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0) ·∑
n
P{
√
p(1|0, 0)γ001n|0〉A|0〉B +
√
p(1|1, 1)γ111n|1〉A|1〉B +
√
p(1|0, 1)γ011n|0〉A|1〉B +
√
p(1|1, 0)γ101n|1〉A|0〉B}
=
∑
n P{
√
p(1|0, 0)γ001n|0〉A|0〉B +
√
p(1|1, 1)γ111n|1〉A|1〉B +
√
p(1|0, 1)γ011n|0〉A|1〉B +
√
p(1|1, 0)γ101n|1〉A|0〉B}
p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0) ,
(A3)
in which, P{|x〉} = |x〉〈x|. The aim of this EDP is to obtain perfect Bell states |φ+α〉AB = (|0〉A|0〉B +
ei(αA+αB)|1〉A|1〉B)/
√
2. Accordingly, we can define the bit error rate eb and phase error rate ep under basis 0:
eb = A〈0|B〈1|ρ|1〉B |0〉A +A 〈1|B〈0|ρ|0〉B|1〉A =
p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0)
p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0) (A4)
ep = AB〈φ−α|ρ|φ−α〉AB +AB 〈ψ−α|ρ|ψ−α〉AB
=
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n − e−i(αA+αB)√p(1|1, 1)γ111n∣∣2 +∑n ∣∣√p(1|0, 1)γ011n − e−i(αA−αB)√p(1|1, 0)γ101n∣∣2
2(p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0))
6
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n − e−i(αA+αB)√p(1|1, 1)γ111n∣∣2
2(p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0)) + eb (A5)
in which, |φ−α〉AB = (|0〉A|0〉B − ei(αA+αB)|1〉A|1〉B)/
√
2, and |ψ−α〉AB = (|0〉A|1〉B − ei(αA−αB)|1〉A|0〉B)/
√
2. The
goal is to upper-bound ep effectively. Before proceeding, we remark that we just focus on the ep and final key bits
rate for basis 0 for simplicity, and thus we do not need to calculate the density matrix for basis 1. But this basis 0’s
ep must be related to some probabilities of basis 1, such as p(1|3, 2). Now we begin to detail how to obtain an upper
bound of ep.
We substitute the relations (A2) into Eq. (A1) to obtain the following constraints:
Cx0C
′
y0
√
p(z|0, 0)|Γ00z〉E + Cx0C′y1
√
p(z|0, 1)eiθ′y |Γ01z〉E
+ Cx1C
′
y0
√
p(z|1, 0)eiθx |Γ10z〉E + Cx1C′y1
√
p(z|1, 1)ei(θx+θ′y)|Γ11z〉E
=
√
p(z|x, y)|Γxyz〉E ,
(A6)
in which x, y = {2, 3} and z = {0, 1}. Considering that |Γxyz〉E can be spanned by a set of basis |n〉E and with
Eq. (A6), we obtain
∑
n
∣∣C30C′20√p(1|0, 0)γ001n + C31C′21√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
6 (
√
p(1|3, 2) +
√
p(1|0, 1)C30C′21 +
√
p(1|1, 0)C31C′20)2.
(A7)
By observing the left-hand side of (A7) and with the help of triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we
have:
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∑
n
∣∣C30C′20√p(1|0, 0)γ001n + C31C′21√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
>
∑
n
(C30C
′
20
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣− ∣∣C30C′20 − C31C′21∣∣√p(1|1, 1)∣∣γ111n∣∣)2
= C230C
′2
20
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
+ (C30C
′
20 − C31C′21)2p(1|1, 1)− 2C30C′20
∣∣C30C′20 − C31C′21∣∣√p(1|1, 1)∑
n
∣∣γ001n + ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣∣∣γ111n∣∣
> C230C
′2
20
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
+ (C30C
′
20 − C31C′21)2p(1|1, 1)− 2C30C′20
∣∣C30C′20 − C31C′21∣∣√p(1|1, 1)
√∑
n
∣∣γ001n + ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
= (C30C
′
20
√∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2 − ∣∣C30C′20 − C31C′21∣∣√p(1|1, 1))2.
(A8)
Therefore, we obtain
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
2(p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0)) 6

(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|1,1)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
30
C′2
20
, if C30C
′
20 6= 0
1− eb, if C30C′20 = 0.
(A9)
Furthermore, by the same way, we can obtain that
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
2(p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0)) 6

(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|0,0)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
31
C′2
21
, if C31C
′
21 6= 0
1− eb, if C31C′21 = 0.
(A10)
Combining constraints (A9) and (A10), we have
∑
n
∣∣√p(1|0, 0)γ001n +√p(1|1, 1)ei(θ3+θ′2)γ111n∣∣2
2(p(1|0, 0) + p(1|1, 1) + p(1|0, 1) + p(1|1, 0))
6 maxC,C′f(C,C
′) , ε,
(A11)
in which maxC,C′f(C,C
′) means searching over all C30, C31, C′20 and C
′
21 satisfying possible constraints to find the
maximum value of function f(C,C′). Concretely, the f(C,C′) is given by
f(C,C′) =

min{
(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|1,1)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
30
C′2
20
,(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|0,0)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
31
C′2
21
}, if C30C′20 6= 0 and C31C′21 6= 0(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|1,1)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
30
C′2
20
, if C30C
′
20 6= 0 and C31C′21 = 0(√
p(1|3,2)+
√
p(1|0,1)C30C′21+
√
p(1|1,0)C31C′20+
√
p(1|0,0)
∣∣C30C′20−C31C′21∣∣)2
2(p(1|0,0)+p(1|1,1)+p(1|0,1)+p(1|1,0))C2
31
C′2
21
, if C30C
′
20 = 0 and C31C
′
21 6= 0
1− eb, if C30C′20 = 0 and C31C′21 = 0,
(A12)
where min{a, b} yields the smaller one of real numbers a and b
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Next we try to calculate above bounds by considering some constraints on it. Since we have known p(1|3, 0),
p(1|3, 1) and other probabilities for mismatched basis. In other words, we have learned
∣∣
M
〈1|UEve|ϕ3〉C |ϕ′0〉D
∣∣2,∣∣
M
〈1|UEve|ϕ3〉C |ϕ′1〉D
∣∣2, ∣∣
M
〈1|UEve|ϕ0〉C |ϕ′2〉D
∣∣2, ∣∣
M
〈1|UEve|ϕ1〉C |ϕ′2〉D
∣∣2. Substitute the relations (A2) and Eq. (A1)
into these equations, we have
C230p(1|0, 0) + C231p(1|1, 0) + 2C30C31
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|1, 0)Re{eiθ3〈Γ001|Γ101〉} = p(1|3, 0)
C230p(1|0, 1) + C231p(1|1, 1) + 2C30C31
√
p(1|0, 1)p(1|1, 1)Re{eiθ3〈Γ011|Γ111〉} = p(1|3, 1)
C′220p(1|0, 0) + C′221p(1|0, 1) + 2C′20C′21
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|0, 1)Re{eiθ′2〈Γ001|Γ011〉} = p(1|0, 2)
C′220p(1|1, 0) + C′221p(1|1, 1) + 2C′20C′21
√
p(1|1, 0)p(1|1, 1)Re{eiθ′2〈Γ101|Γ111〉} = p(1|1, 2),
(A13)
where Re{x} returns the real part of a complex number x. For the ease of numerical computation, we rewrite above
constraints as
− 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|1, 0)C30C31 6 p(1|3, 0)− p(1|0, 0)C230 − p(1|1, 0)C231 6 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|1, 0)C30C31
− 2
√
p(1|0, 1)p(1|1, 1)C30C31 6 p(1|3, 1)− p(1|0, 1)C230 − p(1|1, 1)C231 6 2
√
p(1|0, 1)p(1|1, 1)C30C31
− 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|0, 1)C′20C′21 6 p(1|0, 2)− p(1|0, 0)C′220 − p(1|0, 1)C′221 6 2
√
p(1|0, 0)p(1|0, 1)C′20C′21
− 2
√
p(1|1, 0)p(1|1, 1)C′20C′21 6 p(1|1, 2)− p(1|1, 0)C′220 − p(1|1, 1)C′221 6 2
√
p(1|1, 0)p(1|1, 1)C′20C′21.
(A14)
Now the task is to calculate ε in Eq.(A11) with constraints Eqs. (A14). Then ep can be calculated easily. Therefore,
the secure-key rate is given by
R = 1−H(eb)−H(ep) = 1−H(eb)−H(min{ε+ eb, 1/2}), (A15)
where H(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x) is the Shannon’s binary entropy function. Note that by employing the
recently developed security proofs [50, 51], our protocol can be secure against the most general attacks, although the
attack analyzed here is collective attack.
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